SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION MODUS OPERANDI 1.1 Under the Income Tax Act, there is an administrative and judicial hierarchy; therefore any judgment delivered by the higher authority would be binding on the lower Authority. The Honorable Income Tax Appellant Tribunal (hereinafter referred as “Hon’ble ITAT”) is the final fact finding authority under Indian Income Tax Act, 1961. Hence, against the order of Income tax Appellant Tribunal, an appeal can be filed before Hon’ble High court only if an issue raised before Hon’ble High Court should involves Substantial Question of Law. Usually any issue decided by the State High court is considered as final, but, if there exist any constitutional issue or legal issue which can only be clarified by the Supreme Court of India, then a special leave is granted by the Supreme Court. Raising an appeal before Supreme Court not be considered a matter of right but it is a matter of privilege which only the Supreme Court will grant, if there exist an important constitutional or legal issue involved that was not properly interpreted by the concerned High Court. The verdict of the Supreme Court is final and considered as law of land. Thus an interpretation placed by higher authority becomes a ‘precedent’ for the lower authority, until it is reversed or modified by a higher authority, or amendment of law by the legislature. 2.0 Special Leave Petition (In brevity ‘SLP’)- Article 136 of Constitution of India 2.1 The Rules governing SLP has been mentioned in the Order XVI of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966. Under these rules, SLP can be filed against High court order refusing to grant certificate of fitness for leave to appeal to Supreme Court. It is also possible to file SLP against the judgment of High court. 2.2 Article 136 of the Constitution of India granting special leave to appeal to Supreme Court reads as under:- “Art. 136. (1) Notwithstanding anything in this Chapter, the Supreme Court may, in its discretion, grant special leave to appeal from any judgment, decree, determination, sentence or order in any cause or matter passed or made by any Court or Tribunal in the territory of India. (2) Nothing in clause (1) shall apply to any judgement, determination, sentence or order passed or made by any Court or Tribunal constituted by or under any law relating to the Armed Forces.” 2.3 After going through the above definition, it can be inferred that Supreme Court shall have the power to grant Special Leave to appeal  From any judgment, decree, determination, sentence or order  in any cause or matter  Passed or made by any court or Tribunal in the territory of India except any law relating to the Armed Force.  Supreme Court may accept or reject SLP 2.3 Under Article 133 of the Constitution of India an appeal shall lies to the Supreme Court from any judgment, decree or final order in a civil proceeding of a High Court, if the High Court certifies under Articles 134A – (a) that the case involves a substantial question of law of general importance and (b) that in the opinion of the High Court the said question needs to be decided by the Supreme Court. Tata Iron & steel Co. Ltd.-vs.- D.V. Bapat ITO (1975) 101 ITR 292. For obtaining a certificate under Article 133, requirements of both the clauses (a) and (b) are to be satisfied. Vrajlal Chhananlal –vs.- CIT (1974) 96 ITR 217 (Guj.) Also see State Bank of India –vs.- Shri N. Sundara Money AIR 1976 SC 1111,1112. Article 134A has been inserted by the constitution ( Forty Fourth Amendment) Act, 1978, section 20 with effect from 1st August 1979. Under this Article, every High Court has been empowered to grant suo motu, certificate fro appeal to the Supreme Court from a judgment, decree etc. referred to in Article 132(1) or Article 133(1) or Article 134(1). Further, such power has also been conferred to grant certificate even on an oral application. Article 134 would apply if there is a judgment, decree of final order. K.M. Joshep Binoy -vs.- Union of India (1992) 194 ITR 453, 455 (Ker). 2.5 Although the time limit for filing a special leave before Hon’ble Supreme Court has not been mentioned under Income Tax Act, but the provisions for the same are contained under Order XVI of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966. Under the said Rules, SLP can be filed against either the Order of High Court rejecting petition for Leave to Appeal to Supreme Court of India; i.e., on High Court refusing to grant Certificate of Fitness for Leave to Appeal to Supreme Court or against the Order/Judgment itself. It is also possible to file SLP against the Judgment of the High Court either in Writ Petition or in the Income-tax Reference. If the Petition is filed against the Judgment of the High Court, the time limit is 90 days from the date of Judgment/Order and if the Petition is filed against the Order of High Court refusing to grant Certificate of Fitness for Appeal, the time limit is 60 days from the date of Order refusing to grant Certificate.(Cf. Patiala Cement Co. Ltd. -vs.- CIT (1956) 29 ITR 219 (Pepsu) 2.6 The court fees for filing special leave has been mentioned under Third Schedule of The Supreme Court Rules, 1966 which is as follows: a) On SLP, the Court fees payable is Rs. 250/-; b) In case of petition on certificate granted by High Court, the Court fees payable is Rs. 250/- if the amount in dispute is Rs. 20,000/- or less and for every Rs. 1,000/- in excess of Rs. 20,000/- Rs. 5/- but the maximum Court fees payable does not exceed Rs. 2,000/-. 2.5 The petitioner should appoint an Advocate on record in New Delhi and send a Vakalatnama in favour of the proposed Advocate on record who will be filing the SLP. The Proforma for filing of an appeal before Hon’ble Supreme Court is predefined. 3.0 Substantive law under Income Tax Act, 1961 3.1 Prior to 1926 there was not provision in the Income Tax Act for an appeal against a High court decision passed in a reference. In the case of Tata Iron & Steel Co. –vs.- Shief Revenue Authority (1923) 50IA 212 an appeal was taken to the Privy Council against a high Court decision in reference under section 51 of the Income Tax Act, 1918 which corresponded to section 66 of the 1922 Act. The Privy Council upheld a preliminary objection of the respondent that no appeal is provided for in the law against such high court decisions in a reference cases. Also see Delhi Cloth & general Mills Co. Ltd. Vs.- CIT, AIR 1927 PC 242; Radha Krishna Aiyer vs.-Swaminatha Aiyer, AIR 1921 PC. The legislature then inserted section 66A by Act 24 of 1926 to provide for an appeal against eh judgment of the High Court to the Privy Council. Section 261 and 262 of the 1961 Act corresponds to section 66A(2) and 66A(3) of 1922 Act. 3.2 Under Income Tax Act two section namely 261 and 262 deals with appeal and hearing before SC. Section 261 which deal with Appeal to SC reads as under:- “An appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court from any judgment of the High Court delivered [before the establishment of the National Tax Tribunal] on a reference made under section 256 [against an order made under section 254 before the 1st day of October, 1998 or an appeal made to High Court in respect of an order passed under section 254 on or after that date] in any case which the High Court certifies to be a fit one for appeal to the Supreme Court”. 3.3 After perusal of the above section, it can be inferred that an appeal can be filed before SC only in the case when High Court certifies to be a fit one for appeal to the SC. Once the National Tax Tribunal (in short ‘NTT’) will be established, the taxation matter would be taken care by NTT rather than High Court. In CIT -vs.- Kamal Sing Rampuria (1967) 64 ITR 527 (Cal) has discussed the point at great length about the fitness for the grant of a certificate. His lordship has laid down the following principle of fitness for the grant of a certificate arising out of a case under section 66A(2) of the 1922 Act:-  When a question is fairly and really arguable and not at all free from difficulty;  When there exist already a difference of opinion either in the same High court or in different High court or in different High Courts or a room for it;  When it is still an open question and not finally settled by the Supreme Court;  When a precedent is necessary to be created;  Where the question touches successive reference and the interest is recurring  Where there are complexities of law requiring authoritative interpretation by the Supreme Court even touching the cases of small value  Where the dispute is not measurable by money, but is one of great public importance, such as those relating to religious rights or ceremonies, to caste and family rights as well as the question of wide public importance such as question affecting the whole community. Further, where the language of a provision is clear, the mere fact that the interpretation of a provision of law is involved, by that reason alone cannot be regarded as raising a substantial question of law, which would require the decision of the Supreme Court thereon. CIT –vs.- Bhagavanthy Ammal, (1999) 240 ITR 451, 459 (Mad.) The Certificate of fitness to appeal issued by the high Court need not mention each question in respect of which an appeal could be filed. The High Court has to state the reasons for the grant of a certificate but once the certificate is granted and an appeal filed pursuant to it, there will be no restriction, either in scope of the appeal or the jurisdiction of the appellant court to deal with it. (CIT -vs.- Warner Hindustan Ltd. (1987) 165 ITR 692 (AP) 3.3 The finance (No. 2) Act, 1998 brought an amendment made w.e.f. 01-10-1998 in section 261 by this act secures that the appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court from any judgment delivered on  A reference made under section 256 against an order made under section 254 before 01-10-1998 or  w.e.f. 01-10-1998 an appeal made to high court in respect of an order passed under section 254 on or after that date. 4.0 Effect of order passed in pursuance of SLP – Result or Effect 4.1 There are two distinct stages of SLP before Supreme Court i.e. one is granting special leave to appeal and second hearing the appeal. Under the former stage, it is totally depend on the Supreme Court whether to grant special leave or not. To entertain SLP, is not a matter of right but a matter of privilege which only the Supreme court will grant, if there exist an important constitutional or legal issue involved in any case that was not properly interpreted by the concerned High Court. The Supreme Court may reject the petition seeking grant of special leave to appeal, for several reasons. When such SLP is rejected or allowed what would be its consequences. Can it be pre assumed that the Supreme Court has declared its view on the legal aspect involved and hence by virtue of Article 141 of the Constitution, it would be binding on all the lower authority prevailing in India? There are some judgment and/or clarifications on the same issue which is enumerated herein below. 4.1 The scope of SLP is very wide. One cannot claim that since the tribunal in the taxation matter being the final fact finding authority and henceforth no one can go into the factual of the case. It totally depends on the Supreme Court whether to admit the question of law or not. In this regard the powers of the Supreme Court has been examined and critically held in the case of Dhakeswari Cotton Mills. Ltd. -vs.- CIT West Bengal 1954 INDLAW SC 1. The moot question before the Supreme Court in the above case was whether power conferred on Supreme Court by Article 136 of Constitution being an extraordinary power, should not be exercised for purpose of reviewing findings of fact when law dealing with subject has declared those findings as final and conclusive. The Hon’ble apex court held that when court reaches conclusion that a person has been dealt with arbitrarily or that a court or tribunal within territory of India has not given a fair deal to a litigant, then no technical hurdles of any kind like finality of finding of facts or otherwise can stand in way of exercise of this power because whole intent and purpose of this article is that it is duty of SC to see that injustice is not perpetuated or perpetrated by decisions of Courts and tribunals because certain laws have made decisions of these Courts or tribunals final and conclusive. There is no rule of principle as to when such leave ought to be granted and when it ought to be refused can be laid down as each case would depend on its peculiar facts. 5.0 Dismissal or Acceptance of SLP - Effect As discussed above, it all depends on the Supreme Court about the admission of question framed before Apex Court. If the petition is dismissed at the stage of SLP without a speaking or reasoned order, then there will not be any res judicta*(* means a case or suit already decided), no merger of the lower order and the petitioner retains the statutory right, if available of seeking relief in review jurisdiction of the High court. If SLP is dismissed at the first stage by speaking a reasoned order, there is still no merger but rule of judicial discipline and declaration of law under article 141 of the constitution apply. Order of Supreme Court would mean that it has declared the law and in that light the case was considered not fit for grant of leave. But once leave is granted and SLP converted into appeal is dismissed with or without reasons, merger results and law is declared. It is no permissible to move the High Court by review and no court, tribunal or authority can express any opinion contrary to the view taken by Supreme Court. The same proposition was fortifies by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Kunhayammed –vs.- State of Kerala 2001 (129)E.L.T.11 (S.C). In the case of Commissioner of Income Tax –vs.- Ruby Traders and Exporters Ltd. (2003) 263 ITR 300 (Cal) held that dismissal of SLP by the Supreme Court by a non speaking order has no binding effect under Article 141 of the constitution. 5.1 In the case of Indian Oil corporation Ltd. –vs.- State of Bihar and others (1987) 27 E.L.T. 578 (S.C), the Hon’ble Apex court has critically held that effect of the non-speaking order of dismissal of a Special Leave Petition without indicating the grounds or reasons of its dismissal must, by necessary implication, be taken to be that this Court had decided only that it was not a fit case where special leave should be granted. This conclusion may have been reached by this court due to several reasons. When the order passed by this Court was not a speaking one it is not correct to assume that this court had necessarily decided implicitly in relation to the merits of the award which was under challenge before this Court in the Special Leave Petition. A writ proceeding is a wholly different and distinct proceeding. It is true that questions which have been decided by this Court expressly, implicitly or even constructively while dismissing the Special leave Petition, cannot, of course be re-opened in a subsequent proceeding before the High Court. But, neither in the principle of res judicata nor on any principle of public policy analogous thereto, would the order of this Court dismissing the Special Leave Petition operate to bar the trial of identical issues in a separate proceeding namely the writ proceeding before the High Court merely on the basis of an uncertain assumption that the issues must have been decided by this Court at least by implication. It is not correct or safe to extend the principle of res judicata or constructive res judicata to such an extent so as to found it mere guess work. In such cases, it would work extreme hardship and injustice if the High Courts were to close its doors to the Petitioner and refuse the relief under Article 226 of the Constitution on the sole ground of dismissal of the Special Leave Petition. 5.2 Further the Full bench of Hon’ble Patna High Court in the case of Smt. Tej kumara –vs.- Commissioner of Income Tax & Ors. (2000) 164 CTR 201 (Patna) has held that once civil appeal is dismissed by Supreme Court after hearing the parties holding that the appeal has no merit, such order become one which attracts Article 141 of the constitution and the law laid down is binding on all courts. The Hon’ble Delhi CESTAT in the case of Commissioner of Central Excise, Raipur –vs.- BSBK Pvt. Ltd. 2009 (13) S.T.R. 26 (Tri. –Del) fortifies the same view and held that summary rejection of SLP or appeal not means affirmation, on merit, of order under challenge. Summary rejection means Supreme Court declining to interfere with the impugned order. Further in the case of Sun Export Corporation –vs.- Collector of Customs, 1997 AIR SC 2658, 2660-61, it has been held that where an appeal against an order taking a particular view has been rejected by the Supreme Court in limine at the admission stage, such dismissal cannot be relied upon as a binding precedent so as to approve the view taken in the order appealed against. 5.3 The Supreme Court in the case of V.M. Salgaocar & Bros. (P.) Ltd. etc –vs.- CIT (2000) 160 CTR 225 distinguish the concept of dismissal of special leave petition vis.- a– vis. summary dismissal of appeal and held that when special leave petition is dismissed by saying ‘dismissed’ the Supreme Court does not comment on the correctness or otherwise of the order from which leave to appeal is sought. It only means that the court does not consider it to be fit case for exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution. However, when an appeal provided under Article. 133 are dismissed with the words ‘the appeal is dismissed’ the supreme court upholds the decision of the High court or of the Tribunal from which the appeal was filed. 5.4 Article 141 of the Constitution of India provides that the law declared by the Supreme Court shall be binding on all the courts within the territory of India. Thus the law as interpreted by the Supreme Court is binding on all the courts and tribunal in India. The same proposition was held in a plethora of judgments inter alia CIT –vs.- Aluminium Corporation of India Ltd. (1972) 85 ITR 167,172 (SC); Smt. Shreekunwardwvi Dafa –vs.-ITO (1972) 85 ITR 451, Collector of Custom -vs.- State of Kerala (1993) 91 STC 596 (ker). In the case of Sabyasachi Sengupta –vs.-Nani Gopal Datta, (1990) Supp SCC 315, 321 (SC), the Supreme Court held that it is the settled principle of law that any order or direction pronounced by the Supreme Court in exercise of its juridication in any matter pending before it, that order or direction is binding on all the courts within the territory of India and should be implemented and executed in all its rigour. A plea for an order or direction of the Supreme Court which will tantamount to nullifying its own order which had reached its finality, cannot be accepted as that will be only a mockery of 5.5 The general principle of law laid down by the Supreme Court stands applicable to every person irrespective of the fact whether he is a party to the order or not. The same verdict is laid down in the case of M.S.L. Patil –vs.- State of Maharashtra, (1996) 11SCC 361, 363). In the case of Poothundu Plantation Pvt. LTd. -vs.- ITO (1996) 221 ITR 557, 560 (SC) held that If the Supreme Court has construed the meaning a section, then any decision to the contrary given by any other authority must be held to be erroneous and such error must be treated as an error apparent on the record. Further in the same line another case named Himachal Pradesh Financial Corporation –vs.- CIT (1998) 233 ITR 450, 452 (HP), held that when the Supreme Court has decided a matter on a question of law, it is law of the land audit has to be followed by all the Tribunals and the courts in this country vide Article 141 of the Constitution of India. Hence, if he Tribunal had decided a matter overlooking the judgment of the Supreme Court on a question of law, it is certainly a mistake apparent from the record and certainly be rectified under section 254(2). Further, the Hon’ble Gujarat High Court in the case of M. Ravji –vs.- State of Gujarat (1993) 89 STC 228, 234 (Guj.) that the tribunal is bound to follow the principle of law laid down by the Supreme Court. It is not open to the tribunal to say that the Supreme Court decision was not relevant simply because it was not under the statute under which the tribunal is working. 5.6 Indeed it is a matter of judicial discipline that requires that when the Supreme Court states as to what the law on the matter is, the same shall be binding on all the courts within the territory of India. The mandate of article 141 of the Constitution is not based on any doctrine of precedents, but is an imprimatur to all the courts that the law declared by the Supreme Court is binding on them. If that is so, it is not open to the High Court to consider the effect of an earlier Supreme Court decision, its scope what was decided therein and whether there could be any distinction between that decision and a later Supreme Court decision . Even where the Supreme Court did not specifically refer to a High Court decision, the same stood impliedly overruled because the law declared by the Supreme Court was contrary to what was stated in the High Court decision. C.N. Rudramurthy –vs.-K. Barkathulla Khan (1998) 8 SCC 275, 279 and 280) 5.7 In case of conflicting decisions of the Supreme Court rendered by the two benches of the same strength, the subsequent or later decision would prevail. Nandanam Construction Co. -Vs.- Asstt. Commissioner (1983) Tax Lr. 2816,2820 (AP) ; Gujarat Housing Board -vs.- Nagajibhai LAxmanbhai AIR 1986 Guj. 81, 88 (FB). Further, when a bench of Supreme Court is not only aware of the decision of the larger bench but in fact explains, distinguish or identifies the correct ratio of an earlier larger bench Supreme Court judgment, then the lower courts have no choice but to follow the later decision thoufh rendered by a bench of lesser strength than the one opposed to it. Century Spinning Mfg.Co. –vs.- State of West Bengal (1989) 73 STC 277,316 (Cal.). A Larger bench of the Supreme Court can overrule the decision of its smaller bench. Smt. Triveniben- vs.- State of Gujarat, (1989) 1 SCC 678, 701 -02 (SC) following A.R. Anthulay –vs.- R.S. Nayak, 1988 AIR SC 1531, 1548) 5.8 A coordinate bench of Supreme Court cannot differ from the decision of an earlier Bench. Where a subsequent co-ordinate bench finds itself unable to agree with an earlier bench decision, the matter should be referred to a larger bench. Union of India –vs.- Godfrey Philips India Ltd. AIR 1986 SC 806, 815. 5.9 There are ample powers conferred by Article 32 read with Article 142 to make orders which have the effect of law by virtue of Article 141 and there is mandate to all the authorities to act in aid of the orders of the Supreme Court as provided in Article 144 of the Constitution. In a catena of decisions of the Supreme Court, this power has been recognized and exercised, if need be by issuing necessary direction to fill the vacuum recognized and exercised, if need be, by issuing necessary direction to fill the vacuum till such time the legislature steps in to cover the gap or the executive discharge its role in Vineet Narain –vs.- Union of India, AIR 1998 SC 889, 914-15. 5.10 Judgment of the courts are not to be construed as statutes. To interpret words, phrases, and provisions of a statute, it may become necessary for judges to embark into lengthy discussion but the discussion is meant to explain and not to define. Judges interpret statutes, they do not interpret judgment. They interpret words of statute; their words are not to be interpreted as statute. The same proposition was upheld in the case of Amar Nath Om Parkash –vs.- State of Punjab (1986) 62 STC 130, 143. Also see Sreenivasa General Traders –vs.- State of AP, AIR 1983 SC 1246; London Graving Dock Co. Ltd. -vs. Horton 1951 AC 737, 761. A decision should be treated as given per incuriam*(*through lack of care) when it is given in ignorance of the terms of a statuteor of a rule having the force of a statute. Municipal Corporation of Delhi -vs.-Gurnam Kaur, (1989) 1 SCC 101, 110(SC). In other words, when a decision is rendered without noticing a binding precedent or an inconsistent statutory provision, it is per incuriam and therefore, loses its efficacy as a precedent. There is no doubt that the per incuriam principle is applied rarely and the court is very slow and reluctant in declaring a judgment per incuriam. But nevertheless if the decision has been given in ignorance or forgetfulness of some inconsistence statutory provision of some authority binding on the court that has resulted in reasons which are apparently and demonstrably unsustainable, the court may be left with no option but to treat such decision per incuriam and not a binding decision.(Kamla Kant Dube -vs.- M.V. Umang, AIR 2000 Bom. 211,222) 6.0 Power to review a judgment 6.1 It is well settled that a party is not entitled to seek a review of a judgment delivered by the Supreme Court merely for the purpose of a rehearing and a fresh decision of the case. The normal principle is that a judgment pronounced by the court is final and departure from that principle is justified only when circumstances of a substantial and compelling character make it necessary to do so.Sajjan sing -vs.- State of Rajasthan (1965) 1 SCR 933. For instance, if the attention of the court is not drawn to a material statutory provision during the original hearing, the court will review its judgment. Girdhari Lal Gupta -vs.- D.N. Mehta (1971) 3 SCR 748 at 760. The court may also reopen its judgment if a manifest wrong has been done and it is necessary to pass an order to do full and effective justice. O.N. Mohindroo -vs.-District Judge, Delhi AIR 1971 SC 107. 6.2 In the case of Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. –vs.- State of Bihar (1955) 6 STC 446 (SC) it was discussed that at the same time, the Supreme Court has the power to review its own decision. The power of review must be exercised with due care and caution and only for advancing the public well being in the light of the surrounding circumstances of each case brought to its .It is not right to confine that power within rigidly fixed limits as where a material provision of law has been overlooked in the previous decision or where the decision has proceeded upon the mistaken assumption of the continuance of a repealed or expired statue. There is nothing in the constitution of India which prevent the Supreme Court from departing from a previous decision if the court is convinced of its error and its baneful effect on the general interests of the public. 6.3 The question as to when the Supreme Court should overrule its own decision has been considered in several cases such as Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. -vs.- State of Bihar AIR 1955 SC 661; Mangaldas Chhaganlal P. Ltd. -vs.- Municiple corporation of Greater Mumbai AIR 1974 SC 2009, 2042. A more compendious examination of the problem was undertaken in Kesav Mills Co. Ltd. -vs.- CIT (1965) 56 ITR 365, 377 (SC) where the Supreme Court pointed out that it is not possible or desirable, and in any case it would be inexpedient to lay down any principle which should govern the approach of the court in dealing with the question of reviewing and revising its earlier decisions. It would always depend upon several relevant considerations: what is the nature of the infirmity or error on which a plea for a review and revision of the earlier view is based? On the earlier occasion did some patent aspects of the question remain unnoticed, or was the attention of the court not drawn to any relevant and material statutory provision, or was any previous decision of this court bearing on the point not noticed? Is the court hearing such plea fairly unanimous that there is such an error in the earlier view? what would be impact of the error on the feneral administration of law or on public goods. These and other relevant consideration must be carefully borne in mind whenever this court is called upon to exercise its jurisdiction to review and revise its earlier decisions. These considerations become still more significant when the earlier decision happens to be a unanimous decision of the Bench of five learned judges of this court. 7.0 Power of Supreme Court under Article 142 7.1 The power of Supreme court under Article 142 is very wide and can be exercised in the ends of justice. Ram Chand-vs.- Union of India 1993 (5) SC 465, 477. It is true that the Supreme Court when exercise its discretionary power under article 136 of passes any order under article 142,it does so with great care and due care and due circumspection. But, when the Supreme Court are settling the law in exercised of their discreation, such law, so settled, should be clear and become operational instead of being kept vague, so that it could become a binding precedent in all similar cases to arise in future. The same proposition was upheld in the case of Union of India –vs.- Karnail Singh (1995) 2 SCC 728 (SC) 7.2 it must be remembered that wider the amplitude of its power under Article 142, the greater is the need for care fro the Supreme Court to see that power is used with restraint without pushing back the limits of the constitution sop as to function within the bounds of its own jurisdiction. To the extent the Supreme Court makes the statutory authorities and other organs of the State perform their duties in accordance with law, its role is unexceptionable but it is not permissible for the court to take over the role of statutory bodies or other organs of the state and perform their function. Supreme Court Bar Association –vs.- Union of India AIR 1998 SC 1895, 1918-19. The Supreme Court while exercising power under Article 142 cannot ignore the substantive rights of a litigant while dealing with a cause pending before it. The power cannot be used to supplant substantive law applicable to a case. Article 142 even with the width of its amplitude, cannot be used to build a new edifice where none existed earlier, by ignoring express statutory provisions dealing with a subject and thereby achieve something indirectly which cannot be achieved directly .State of Punjab –vs.-Bakshish Singh 1998 8 SCC 222, 225 7.3 Article 129 of the Constitution of India provides that the Supreme Court shall be a court of record and shall have all the powers of such a court including the power to punish for contempt of itself. The Supreme Court has consistently held that the Supreme Court has power under Article 129 to punish, not merely for contempt of itself, but also for contempt of all courts and Tribunals subordinate to it. ITAT –vs.- V.K. Aggarwal (1999) 235 ITR 175, 182 (SC). Reference in this connectin may also be made to Delhi Judicial Service Assiciation, Tis Hazari Court Delhi-vs.-State of Gujarat (AIR) 1991 SC 2176. Disclaimer The views expressed herein above are strictly personal to the writer. With Best Wishes. Sandeep Nagar (Chartered Accountant) Mumbai. sbnagarca@gmail.com 31-10-2009

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